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Abstract
Why are young children particularly prone to make false positive errors or false alarms when
identifying a wrongdoer? In three studies the problem was approached using a signal detection
analysis, focusing on the moral costs of false alarms, as understood at different points in
development. The findings are: (1) decisional criteria became more conservative, indicating
fewer false alarms, with age in three studies, (2) children’s beliefs about the seriousness of false
alarms and misses changed from (a) a non-moral concern to (b) a moral concern for false
negatives or misses to (c) a moral concern for false alarms. (3) These findings were replicated in
two demographically different communities. More critically, (4) how the filmed event is framed
e.g., as a moral transgression (stealing) or a pro-social (helping) act (Study 1); and as intentional
with little damage or unintentional with major damage (Study 3), interacts with age in
influencing decisional criteria.

Key Words: Moral Decision-Making, Eyewitness Identification, Signal Detection, Moral
Intentionality
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Psychologists have had a long-term interest in children’s eyewitness identification for
both theoretical and practical reasons. The policy implications are obvious (e.g., Ceci & Bruck,
1995; NY Times editorial, 8/26/11; Poole & Lamb, 1998) given the controversies surrounding
the veracity of children’s testimony and about the processes involved in obtaining testimony,
especially as to whether young children’s testimony is reliable and especially likely to lead to
false convictions (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Cutler, & Penrod, 1995; Pezdek & Roe, 1994).
Thus, interest in children’s eyewitness identification has spawned a huge research literature. It
has been studied from the point of view of memory, suggestibility, cognitive development,
decision-making, etc., and combinations of these perspectives. This intersection of traditional
sub-fields of study, e.g., memory and suggestibility, (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993) has also lent
particular theoretical interest to the study of children’s eyewitness identification. Here we focus
on eyewitness identification as moral decision-making.
Several studies (e.g., Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999; Roebers, Moga, & Schneider, 2001;
Wells & Loftus, 2003; see Keast, Brewer & Wells, 2007 for mixed results) have shown that
younger children are not only inclined to make errors in general when trying to identify the
guilty person, but in particular, to make more false positive errors or false alarms (i.e., declare
an innocent person guilty) than false negative errors or misses (failing to identify the true
culprit). 1 Further, confidence is no guarantee of accuracy (e.g., Sporer et.al, 1995; Keast et.al,
2007).
We begin with the question, ‘What is different about eyewitness identiﬁcation and other
forms of person identiﬁcation?’ The difference between choosing someone as (i) guilty or as
innocent of a transgression and (ii) remembering whether someone was present or as absent (at
an event) is that choosing someone as guilty or as innocent is to make a moral decision, that is, a

3

Running Head: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AS MORAL DECISION-MAKING

decision with obvious implications for fairness to others and for the welfare of society, whereas
simply identifying someone as being present at an event has no such implications. In a sense, we
are specifying an answer to the suggestion raised by Brewer, Weber, and Semmler (2005): ‘They
[young children] may have a less sophisticated understanding of the purposes of an identiﬁcation
test and the consequences of choosing or not choosing, making an incorrect choice, or even
making a correct choice’ (p. 187).
Thus, our central assumption is that eyewitness testimony has moral consequences, which
may be understood differently at different points in moral and cognitive development. What
might these implications be? Our overarching hypothesis is based on the seminal research on
children’s moral judgments by Jean Piaget (1965/1932). According to Piaget, children at
different points in development view the purposes and fairness of punishment differently. He
found that younger children believe in the superiority of what he termed expiative justice, harsh
and arbitrary punishments, in contrast to older children’s preference for restitutive justice,
punishment which is proportional, moderate, and related to the offense. Younger children also
approve of all forms of collective punishment, the punishment of the group for the misbehavior
of one of its members; whereas older children only do so under certain special conditions. He
also posited that young children believe that wrongdoing, even with unintended consequences,
demands punishment, and the harsher, the better. He found that younger children tend to follow
consequences rather than intentions in judging culpability. The importance of moral
intentionality and outcome will be addressed when we describe Study 3.
Despite this potential link between children’s moral development, especially their
attitudes towards punishment, and their eyewitness identiﬁcation, there are, to our knowledge, no
published empirical studies that have examined children’s identiﬁcation errors within a moral
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decision-making frame- work. Thus, what we believe is needed to understand the development
of children’s eyewitness identiﬁcation fully is to place it in the framework of the development of
moral decision-making.
Rather than simply ask about the seriousness of false alarms and misses in a decontextualized and non-moral context, we decided to set the inquiry in the context of a facial
identification or eyewitness task.2 Three studies are reported here, which have the following
characteristics: (i) Each participant is individually shown a specially prepared brief ﬁlm and then
performs an identiﬁcation task in which the participant is asked to identify whether each of a
series of face photos, presented sequentially, is the guilty person or not and how conﬁdent the
‘witness’ is of his or her judgments; (ii) in two of the studies, the visually identical ﬁlm was
‘framed’ (verbally described by means of a voice-over) so as to have different moral
implications. That is, each participant saw the 54 photos sequentially. Thus, there are nine signal
plus noise (perp) trials and 45 noise only (foils) trials per participant. The ﬁrst study framed the
ﬁlm as either (a) a transgression, stealing, or (b) a pro-social act, helping. The second study used
only the stealing framing but introduced instructions to discourage either false alarms or misses.
In the third study, the act was framed as either (c) an intended transgression resulting in little
material damage or (d) an unintended transgression resulting in major material damage. (iii) At
the end of the identiﬁcation task, each participant was then asked about the seriousness of false
alarms or misses in a child-friendly way, described in the succeeding discussions.
Our initial prediction was that younger children would choose the misses as worse with
justifying reasons, which stressed the importance of punishing the guilty party, but that with age
this would shift to a choice of false alarms as worse because of the desire to avoid punishing an
innocent person, in accordance with Western philosophical and legal concerns. Of course, we did
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not expect well-formed philosophical or legal justiﬁcations in support of these judgments. The
exact point of transition could not realistically be predicted because as prior research in the area
of moral development has shown, these points of transition depend on socio-cultural factors,
such as socio-economic status (SES), as well as how the questions are posed (e.g., Kohlberg,
1969). With much developmental research, it is the direction of change rather than the exact
points of transition that is deemed critical.
Our research strategy utilizes the signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) as a
useful tool in analyzing such decisions in that it separates two aspects of performance: (i)
sensitivity or discriminability between signal (here, the perpetrator) and noise (the foils) and (ii)
bias or the criterion set for making a positive identiﬁcation. The latter is an index of the relative
balance of false alarms to misses corrected for chance. Unlike many studies of eyewitness
identiﬁcation, it is this measure of decisional bias, termed bias, where the decision-maker
implicitly sets his or her criterion for making a positive identiﬁcation, rather than the overall
accuracy (sensitivity), which is the focus of interest.
The studies have these purposes: the ﬁrst was to demonstrate the feasibility of studying
children’s, in particular, younger children’s (6 to 9 years old) judgments using a signal detection
method and demonstrating the two predicted phenomena: (i) that bias or the index of the
decisional criterion implicit in the identiﬁcation judgments increases (indicating fewer false
alarms) with age if the actor being judged committed a moral transgression; (ii) that the
children’s explicit judgments of which kind of decisional error is worse also changes with age;
and (iii) that these two kinds of indices, one involving actual performance on the
eyewitness/facial recognition task and the other the beliefs about the seriousness of false
alarms/false negatives, are related.
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Although detection-theory procedures have been applied extensively to the investigation
of many sensory modalities (e.g., Gescheider, 1985) and memory (e.g., Miller & Wolford, 1999),
there have been fewer studies of children’s memory that have used signal detection-theory
procedures (Cultice, Somerville, & Wellman, 1983; Gee & Pipe, 1995; Locksley, Stangor,
Hepburn, Grosovsky, & Hochstrasser, 1984; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005;
Pezdek & Banks, 1996), and, to our knowledge, even fewer have used the full signal detection
procedures to examine children’s decision- making in an eyewitness identiﬁcation context, for
example, sometimes too few trials were used in the studies.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that younger children’s judgments use a less stringent decisional
criterion (indicated by a lower bias score) than would older children and adolescents, over and
above any differences in sensitivity or accuracy. Hence, younger children would make more
false alarms than older children and adolescents.
Study 1
The purpose of the first study was to explore (1) whether children as young as 6 or 7
years could understand and perform the task, (2) whether decisional bias or the tendency to use a
more stringent decisional criterion, committing fewer false alarms, increases with age, and (3)
whether beliefs about decisional errors, whether false alarms or misses are worse, also change
with age.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight children were recruited from a Roman Catholic parochial school in one of the
outer-boroughs of New York City. This community and school itself are characterized by great
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ethnic diversity and include many children whose families were from Latin America and Asia.
All children were fluent in English. Twenty-five participants were male and 23 female.
Twenty-four 6-9-year-olds (14 male and 10 female, M = 7.5, SD =1.2 mos.) and 24 11-to 14year-olds (11 male, 13 female, M = 12.6, SD =.84 mos.) participated with parental permission.
Design and Procedure
The design was in a 2 age groups by 2 conditions (moral transgression /stealing vs. prosocial/helping) factorial design. Twenty-four participants were randomly assigned to the stealing
and 24 to the helping conditions. All participants were individually shown a short video
depicting four men, all dressed in identical red t-shirts, practicing soccer in a locker-room. They
enter the locker room together, put their gear away and then at the end of the video one of the
men leaves carrying two sports bags, one with a New York Yankees logo on it, which had been
brought into the locker room by one of the other men.
Each child was given instructions both before and after seeing the film, which were
designed to set the meaning of or frame the act, as a moral transgression (stealing) or pro-social
moral act (helping). The participants in the Stealing condition were asked to pretend that they
were witnesses to a crime and that their task was to identify the man who stole the bag. Those in
the Helping condition were asked to pretend that the man took the bags to the owner in order to
help him, and the owner wanted to find the man to give him a reward.
After seeing the film, they were asked to tell what they had seen, i.e., what had happened
in the film, and if the participant did not mention the nature of the act (stealing or helping) the
experimenter did. These instructions were given just before the child began the task to ensure
that the framing of the film was remembered and understood. All children were then told that
they were going to see three series of photographs, presented sequentially, and for each
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photograph they were going to be asked whether or not it was the man who took the bags, and
how sure they were whether it was or was not the man. Their judgments were made using a 4point scale, consisting of two blue and two red smiling faces (see Appendix) to clearly
distinguish the choices. The scale was carefully explained to each participant, and each child was
familiarized with it and its use until he/she was proficient. Specifically, for each photograph,
they were then asked to indicate whether they were very sure that it was the man who took the
bag, or a little bit sure that it was the man who took the bag, or a little bit sure that it was not the
man who took the bag, or very sure it was not the man who took the bag. This procedure is
known in the signal detection literature as the confidence rating procedure and reduces the
number of trials need to obtain reliable measures (Gescheider, 1985). A set of 18 photographs
consisted of the man who had taken the bags away at the end of the video (the perpetrator or
‘perp’) and 5 foils (3 men who had not taken the bags away at the end of the video and 2 foils
who were not in the video at all). The photos were ‘head-and-shoulders’ shots, with each
individual wearing the same red t-shirt, as had been worn in the video. The perpetrator or ‘perp’
and the foils were all photographed against an identical, neutral background. Each individual
was presented one-third of the time frontally, one-third in left profile and one-third in right
profile. Within each of the three presentation sets, order of photo presentation was determined
randomly, except that no individual’s photographs appeared consecutively in any one set. In all,
children were exposed to 54 photographs (trials), with the ‘perp’ being presented nine times, and
the foils being presented 45 times.
We should note that we understand that this lineup procedure is unusual and may not
elicit the most accurate judgment. For example, the elimination line-up (e.g., Pozzulo & Lindsay,
1999) produces more accurate identification under certain conditions. However, maximizing
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accuracy was not our immediate aim. Rather, this procedure was used in order to help uncover
the underlying processes of eyewitness judgments, in particular bias or the relative
preponderance of false alarms-to-misses errors.
At the conclusion of this phase of the study, children were asked a series of questions
about the seriousness of false alarms and misses. This was done by individually showing them
the last photos in which they asserted that the photo was the ‘man who did it’ and the last one in
which the child asserted that the photo was not of the ‘man…’ (in counter-balanced order). We
then asked; let’s make believe that you made a mistake…after all everyone makes a mistake once
in a while….how bad a mistake would that be: very bad, a little bad, or not so bad, and why?
The child was then asked if he or she had any questions, was praised for their cooperation,
allowed to choose a colored pen as a reward and given a certificate of appreciation.
Data Analysis
There are two independent parameters that signal detection theory provides. The first
parameter is sensitivity or discriminability, indicated by d’. The higher the d’ score the more the
participant is able to discriminate the perpetrator from the foils (in signal detection terms, the
signal from the signal + noise). The second parameter, in which we are especially interested, is
termed bias, which is an index of the decisional criterion used. Higher scores indicate fewer
false alarms in relation to misses over-and-above what one would expect by chance, i.e., a more
conservative or cautious decisional bias. There are three possible measures of bias or decisional
criteria for each participant (C1, C2, & C3). The three measures were computed by dividing the
responses at the three possible dividing points among the four alternatives: (1) very sure that it is
not the man, (2) a little bit sure that it is not the man, (3) a little bit sure that is the man, and (4)
very sure that it is the man. The measure used was based on the division between (4) “very sure
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that it is the man” and the other three alternatives (1, 2 & 3): i.e., “a little sure that it is the
man”, “a little sure that is not the man” and “very sure that it is not the man” all counting as a
“no” response. This decision to focus on this measure was based on the consistency of the
results when it was used and also on the finding that young children are not only more prone to
make more false alarms, but to identify positively with certainty (e.g., Brewer et al., 2005). The
verbal answers to the questions at the end of the session about the seriousness of false alarms and
misses were coded by independent assessors, who were graduate students and were blind to the
participant’s age and experimental conditions.
Results
Eyewitness Performance
The measure of sensitivity, d’, increased significantly with age, F (1, 44) = 9.84, p <
.003, p2 = .18, and there was no interaction between age and condition, F (1, 44) = 1.95, p > .10,

p2= .03 (See Figure 1). More critical to our hypotheses were the data for bias (C3) (See Figure
2). As noted above, here we report results for responses which indicated a very sure positive
identification and the other three alternatives. Significantly lower bias scores indicate that the
younger children used a looser criterion, i.e., committed relatively more false alarms in the
stealing than helping condition. The overall ANOVA revealed a significant age effect, F (1, 44)
= 10.08, p = .003, p2 = .19, with the bias index increasing with grade (age) and a significant
interaction effect between age and condition, F (1, 44) = 4.76, p = .04, p2 =.10, as expected.
When we tested for age effect by condition, we found: For the helping condition the age
comparisons were not significant; F (1, 22) = 0.54, p>.40. However, the age effect was
significant in the stealing condition was: F (1, 20) = 5.72, p < .001, p2 = .37. The bias scores are

11

Running Head: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AS MORAL DECISION-MAKING

higher for the older children than the younger children indicating, as expected, that as children
become older, they are particularly less likely to make false alarms errors.

Eyewitness Beliefs
We now turn to the children’s beliefs about false alarms and misses as gleaned from the
interviews. Inter-rater reliability for coding the results of the interviews was .85 for a sample of
45 responses from 15 interviews. Responses to the question as to whether it was worse to make
a false alarm or a miss type of error were coded into four categories: (a) a false alarm is worse,
(b) a miss is worse, (c) there is no difference between the two errors, and (d) a confused or ‘don’t
know’ response.
It became apparent that we needed to revise our original hypothesis, namely, that younger
children would choose misses and older children would choose false alarms as worse. The
younger children, who gave specific responses, chose all three possibilities, that is, false alarms
are worse, misses are worse and both equally bad. This surprising lack of preference for misses
became clearer when the reasons justifying their choices were examined. Many of these reasons
did not refer to the moral costs of false alarms or misses, but focused instead on non-morally
relevant considerations, especially task difficulty. Thus, the major results for the children’s
beliefs were: (1) many of the younger children did not justify their judgments of the seriousness
of false alarm and misses by reference to the (moral) outcomes for the accused whereas the older
children did; and (2) the older children judged false alarms as worse than misses, but primarily in
the stealing condition. Test of association by chi-square between age and ‘which is worse’
response reached significance, χ2p (2) = 8.08, p <.02.
Discussion
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The data, in general, supported the performance hypothesis, that younger children would
employ a more lax criterion when making eyewitness judgments specifically of moral
transgressions. That is, in the moral transgression (stealing) condition, children in the younger
age groups had lower bias scores, indicating that they were more prone to make false alarms,
than children in the 11-14 years age group. Children in the youngest age group were more
likely to be very sure that a person was guilty of stealing when he was not than those in the older
age groups. However, this age effect was not found in the pro-social (helping) condition. This
indicates that the moral context in which identification judgments are made influences the
decision-making process, as expected.
Our second hypothesis concerning age differences in beliefs had to be modified. Some of
the youngest (6-9 years old) children gave essentially non-moral reasons for explaining which
kind of error was worse. These reasons usually focused on how difficult or easy the task was,
and made no mention of the importance of convicting the guilty or protecting the innocent. We
thus concluded that the framing of an event of their moral meaning affected the child’s
eyewitness performance in ways that paralleled their beliefs about the meaning of false alarms.
However, as the study had been conducted at a special, parochial school, before further
investigating these findings, we decided to test their external validity or generalizability, by
replicating the main hypotheses with samples of children from two different populations.
Study 2
The first aim of the second study was to replicate the preliminary findings of the first
study that younger children bring a decisional bias favoring false alarms to the eyewitness
identification tasks (when the task is framed as stealing) with more narrowly defined age groups
in two communities, which differed markedly in SES, thus testing for external validity. The

13

Running Head: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AS MORAL DECISION-MAKING
second aim was to investigate whether children’s eyewitness performance and beliefs can be
influenced by instructions, which either emphasized the dangers of false alarms or of misses.
Such a test would indicate whether a ‘mind-set’ which young children might bring to the task
was easily modified. Studies of suggestibility, of course, have a long history in developmental
psychology (e.g., Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M., 1993; Munsterberg, 1908; Roebers, 2002; Yuille, &
Wells, 1991) and suggestions have, of course, been used to study the malleability of adult and
occasionally, child witness, but never, to our knowledge, specifically designed to affect the
decisional criteria brought to an eyewitness task, as distinguished from affecting a particular
identification judgment.
We should note that although there is a huge literature on socio-economic and cultural
differences in moral judgment and reasoning (e.g., Turiel, 2002); we know of no studies which
contrast children’s eyewitness identification by socio-economic background. Indeed, our focus
was not on these differences, as interesting as they might be, but on testing the external validity
or generalizability of the developmental differences by studying them in two communities.
Method
Participants
Sixty-nine participants (36 males and 33 females) were drawn from three age groups;
younger children 7-9 years old; intermediate children aged 10-12 years old; and early
adolescents 13-15 years old recruited from two public schools in two communities differing SES
(see succeeding discussions). The participants in the three age groups from first (lower SES)
school community were: M = 7.3, SD = 1.6 months.; M = 11.5, SD = 2.4 months.; M = 13.5, SD
= 1.8 months. Those from the second (upper-middle SES) school community were M = 7.8, SD =
1.8 months.; M = 11.1, SD = 2.2 months.; and, M = 13.4, SD = 1.2 months.
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These school communities were in Nassau County and Suffolk County on Long Island,
NY, and differed in general SES. The poverty rate (indicated by the percentage of students
eligible for free or reduced cost lunches for the 2003-04 school year) was 66.9% and in the other
was 7.9%. Most of the participants in the first school community were of Latino background
whereas most of those in the second school community were of non-Latino European
background. However, it should be noted that the communities were chosen primarily to
contrast SES rather than ethnicity. The children from the first school community were recruited
from two public schools; those in the second school community were recruited through the
Parent Teacher Association and through a local buying cooperative. A few of the latter were seen
privately at home. All others were seen in classrooms or similar rooms.
Design
The study had a factorial design with three between-subject factors: two school
communities, three age groups and two experimental biasing conditions. Three age groups were
included to better hone in on the developmental trends.
Procedure
The procedure was very similar to that used in the first study, but was administrated by
computer to allow for one experimenter (the first author) to conduct the study. Also, only the
stealing framing condition, and not the helping condition, was used since the developmental
trends were significant and substantial only in that condition in the first study. Participants were
randomly assigned to the two biasing instructions.
The questions about which kind of errors were worse and why were essentially the same
as in Study 1. Two different biasing instructions were then given randomly to the children prior
to viewing the sequential line-up. In trying to bias participants towards making false alarms
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errors and away from making misses the children were told, “You don’t want to let someone who
really stole the backpack to get away with it, do you? (Pause) Don’t you think that the person
who stole the backpack should get punished?” In trying to bias children towards making misses
and away from false alarms errors they were told, “You don’t want someone who didn’t steal
anything to get punished, do you? (Pause) Don’t you think that it would be unfair to punish
someone who didn’t steal anything?” These instructions were designed to alter the decisional
criteria of the participants and were introduced before each of the three sequences of judgments.
Data Analysis
The method of calculating the different parameters of performance were the same as in
Study 1, and again the bias measure presented is based on the difference between the two
positive judgments, a little sure it was the man and very sure it was the man.
Results
The results for eyewitness identification (see Figure 3) were as follows: (1) The
sensitivity measure (d’) was not significant for age, F (2, 68) = 6.62, p =.13, p2 = .87. (2) The
results for C3, presented in Figure 4, were consistent with the first study: Overall, younger
participants were significantly more likely to say that they were very sure it was the perp when it
wasn’t than older participants: F (2, 66) = 7.66, p <.001, p2= .20. Post-hoc analyses showed
that early adolescents (13-15 years) in both communities were less likely to say they were very
sure it was the perp when it was not than both the younger (ages 7-9 years) and the older (ages
10-12 years) children. In addition, children in the upper-middle SES community generally were
significantly less likely to say they were very sure it was the perp when it wasn’t than those in
the lower SES community F (1, 68) = 10.87, p <.002, p2= .13. (3) Surprisingly, biasing
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instructions had absolutely no effect on children’s performance in either community neither as a
main effect F (1, 68) = .228 p> .60, p2= .004, nor in interaction with age, F (2, 68) = .08, p>.9.
The findings show that the younger eyewitnesses and those from the lower SES
community both are more willing to say that they are definitely sure that someone is the guilty
individual than did the older children. This pattern both confirms the earlier developmental
finding just reported, and also shows that community background (a combination of social class
and ethnicity) also affects performance bias.
In addition to which kind of error was worse (false alarms or misses), reasons to justify
these choices were coded for concern for fairness to the accused or concern for punishing the
guilty. The number of reasons focusing on (a) punishing the guilty was subtracted from (b) the
number focusing on protecting the innocent. Non-moral reasons, for example, focusing on task
difficulty, were scored as zero. The results of ANOVA were as follows: (1) There was a
significant interaction of age group by school, F (2, 63) = 3.79, p <.028, p2 = .108. As Figure 5
shows, the age trend was linear for the lower SES community, but not for the upper SES
community. It should be noted that the fact that these differences in the relationship between age
and judgment differ for the two communities is not due to ceiling effects since not all of the
adolescents in the higher SES community choose false alarms as worse or were more concerned
with protecting the innocent. The unexpected finding for the adolescents in the upper-middle
class sample, is discussed later.
Discussion
The second study has confirmed the two findings relating (a) decisional bias and age and
(b) beliefs about false alarms or misses and age, in two samples from very different
communities, thus helping to establish external validity. The exception to the aforementioned
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was the upper-middle class adolescents’ expressed beliefs. Comments made by some of these
adolescents help to elucidate their beliefs. The teenagers from upper-SES community simply did
not consider taking a gym bag as ‘such a big deal’. This led us to use a film depicting a more
serious ‘crime’ for Study 3.
Our hunch is that the community differences may be explained by different experiences
with crime, but this remains purely conjectural. Although intriguing and of considerable interest
for policy, we decided not to focus on these demographic differences, which we leave for
another day, and rather continue studying the basic developmental phenomena. There was a
complete absence of any suggestibility effect. Perhaps, the child’s moral orientation towards
punishment is too robust and strongly entrenched to be influenced by such transitory
interventions.
Study 3
Although we were encouraged by (a) the feasibility of studying young children’s
eyewitness identification using a signal detection method and (b) by the apparent robustness of
the developmental course of performance bias, we were not as satisfied with the framing in
Study 1 because the pro-social condition did not involve a transgression at all and the reason for
searching for the pro-social helper may not have been as motivating as was the search for the
moral transgressor (thief). That is, the participants may have questioned why it was necessary to
identify someone who had performed a morally good act. Thus, we needed two moral rationales
that were equally plausible, but had different moral significance, which depended on the age or
developmental status of the child.
Therefore, for the third study we decided to contrast two kinds of moral rationales against
one another, which according to past research as well as the concept of mens rea, have different
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significance as to moral responsibility (see succeeding discussions). Like in Study 1, the
rationales were established by framing the visually same event as having two different moral
meanings by means of verbal descriptions. Further, these two kinds of framings or meanings
were informed by what is known about how children judge moral encounters. Since Piaget’s
(1932/1965) groundbreaking research on children’s moral judgments, it has been known that
there is a gradual shift from using material outcome as a criterion for judging culpability to
judging according to the actor’s intentions. Although there have been numerous challenges to
the phenomenon on methodological and empirical grounds, (e.g., Karniol, 1978; Keasey, 1978)
and especially to Piaget’s explanation for it, the demonstrations of the shift to what in the law is
termed, the mens rea, is reported to be a robust one when intentions and outcome are confounded
(e.g., Keasey, 1978). Thus, the general conclusion we draw from the moral judgment literature is
not that children are unaware of the intentions behind an act, but rather that they ignore or give
less weight to intentions when the outcome is bad. Thus, although young children may literally
be aware of the bad intentions, they don’t consider them relevant to a judgment of culpability.
Therefore, we framed or narrated the same filmed event (described later) to be either innocently
intended with disastrous outcome, a devastating fire (thus featuring the bad outcome) or
malevolently intended with minor outcome (featuring the bad intentions). It should be noted that
the confounding of the kind of intention with the kind and level of outcome was by design
because it is primarily when intentions and outcome are confounded that developmental
differences emerge. This fits with Piaget’s claim that young children are aware of the intentions
behind an act, but simply consider them largely irrelevant for judging moral culpability and
focus (in his terms, center) on the outcome instead.
Method
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Participants
One hundred participants recruited from a public elementary and junior high school, in
New York City, participated in a study of eyewitness identification, with the usual parent
consent. After removing 14 subjects’ data due to incompleteness, the final sample size was 86
participants, consisting of twenty-eight 7- to 9-year-olds (14 boys, 14 girls, M = 7.9, SD = 8.1),
thirty 10- to 12-year-olds (16 boys, 14 girls, M = 10.9, SD = 9.7), and twenty-eight 13- to 15year-olds (10 boys, 18 girls, M = 13.4, SD =3.6).
Stimulus Materials
The same filmed act of setting a fire (described later) was framed in two different ways:
(a) as involving “neutral” intentions, which resulted in a fire that ruined the restaurant (bad
outcome) and (b) as a “bad” intentional act of trying to set a fire that did not result in any damage
to the restaurant (bad intention) by different voice-overs. One stressed the neutral intentions but
bad outcome and the other the bad intentions but neutral outcome.
The film was professionally shot in a restaurant in lower Manhattan. All the actors were
male, Caucasian, 5ft 11 in. to 6ft 1 in. in height, ages 22-24, dressed in jeans and crew neck
sweaters. There was no audible dialogue among the actors in either film version. The film lasted
127 seconds, with the perpetrator visible for the entire time. He was filmed from various angles,
with his face available from right profile for 90 seconds, left profile for 10 seconds and full
profile for 27 seconds. The two ‘framed’ versions employed in the study are presented below.
Both versions begin with: "Look, there are four men at that table with a lit birthday cake!
It must be someone's birthday. Uh oh, there is an announcement that the restaurant is closing.
They must leave quickly. They have no time to enjoy their cake!" (They blow out the candles
and one man throws the cake in the garbage. The candles are smoking.) “That guy is throwing
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the cake away so that they can get out of the restaurant quickly.” Then the text proceeds
differently in the two conditions:
A. Voice over for Film Version 1 (Neutral Intentions with Bad Outcome): "Uh, oh! He
doesn’t see that the candles are still burning and smoking when he throws out the cake.” “Oh,
look, the garbage can catches on fire and the restaurant gets ruined!" (Show smoke in the
garbage can. Fade to black. Sirens heard.)
B. Voice over for Film Version 2 (Bad Intentions with Neutral Outcome): "Hey, that one
guy is really angry that they can’t eat the cake. So, he throws the cake with the candles still
burning and smoking into the garbage can. He really hopes that the restaurant catches on fire, oh,
but look nothing has happened!" (Show non-smoking garbage can. Fade to black.)
Procedure
To check on moral judgments of the event, after viewing the film, the participants were
first asked three questions in counter-balanced order; “How bad was the man in the film?”,
“…what the man did in the film?”, and “… what happened to the restaurant?” Following this,
they were given the eyewitness identification task. The task was to choose the perpetrator, who
either intentionally or unintentionally started a fire, either one that fizzled out or one that created
major damage. Each participant received the following instructions prior to viewing the lineup.
"Now we would like you to find the man who started the fire [or tried to start a fire]. He may or
may not be in the photos." Each participant was then sequentially shown a series of photos (by
computer), which included (a) the perpetrator, (b) each of the three other men at the restaurant,
(c) the waiter (bystander), and (d) a man, who was not in the film at all.
As in the previous studies, a signal detection procedure was used by presenting the six
individuals each presented frontally and in right and left profiles. The series again consisted of
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three exposures of the 18 photos (six individuals by three angles), yielding 54 judgments in all,
randomly ordered as in the previous studies. All photos were head and shoulder shots with
left/right and frontal profiles. Lineup targets were dressed in dark blue t-shirts and were filmed
against the same background. All participants were familiarized with the procedure so that they
were proficient in its use before the actual judgments began. As in the previous studies this
required a short training procedure for the youngest participants in which they were asked about
something that they were certain was true and something they were certain was untrue and
shown how to represent each option. At the end of photo-identifications, each participant was
asked how bad it would be to say someone did it when he did not (a false alarm) and how bad
would it be to say someone did not do it when he did (a miss), and why it would be bad?
Data Analysis
As in the previous studies and for reasons already noted, the C3 measure of bias was the
focus of our analysis. The method of calculating beliefs about “which is worse” is the same as
reported earlier, in describing study 2. Reliability of coding based on a sample of 38 was 0.95.
Results
Analysis of the sensitivity (d’) measure showed (Figure 6) a significant age effect, F(2,
80) = 3.32, p < .04, p2 = .08, but no trace of a condition or interaction effect , ps > .20. The
measure of bias (C3), the relative balance of false alarms versus misses (shown in Figure 7),
again shows a significant condition effect, F(1, 80) = 8.25, p < .005, p2 = .09), with the youngest
(7- to 9-year-olds) age group committing more false alarm errors than the older children (10- to
12- year-olds) and adolescents. However, this main effect is modified by an interaction age and
condition F (2, 80) = 4.42, p < .015, p2 = .10. Post-hoc tests revealed significant differences
between conditions only for the 10- to 12- year olds (p < .05).
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Beliefs and Reasons Concerning False alarms and Misses
The hypothesis that children’s beliefs about the seriousness of false alarms and misses
change with age was first tested by generating a Which Is Worse Reason Composite Score for
each participant, on the basis of the reasons given to justify “Why is it bad to say the man did it
when he didn’t” or “…didn’t do it when he did?” as already described earlier. ANOVA shows
that the effect of age was significant for the Which is Worse Reason Composite, F (2, 80) = 6.30,
p = .003. p2 = .136, but not for condition, F (1, 80) = 2.23, p > .10. p2 = .027. A higher score
indicates a greater concern for the innocent man being accused unjustly, whereas lower scores
indicate concern for the guilty man going free. Thus, the Which is Worse Reason Composite
measure increased with age regardless of condition, indicating an increasing concern for the
innocent accused, as expected (See Figure 8).
Relationship between Performance Bias and Beliefs about Which is Worse
The third question posed was whether the measure of performance bias was related to
their stated beliefs about the seriousness of false alarms/misses. Figure 9 shows that those who
declared misses to be worse had marginally significantly lower bias scores, indicating a higher
rate of false alarms, than those with higher bias scores, reflecting fewer false alarms but only in
the no-fire condition. ANOVA revealed a marginally significant relationship within the latter
condition, F (1, 51) = 2.98, p < .09, p2 = .06
Moral Judgments
To examine explicit moral judgment beliefs about the two events (fire and no fire), a
Moral Judgment Composite Score was generated for each participant. Participants were asked in
counter-balanced order “How bad the man was in the film,” “How bad was what the man did in
the film”, and “How bad was what happened to the restaurant.” The first two items were
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correlated (r = .35), as expected, and the third was not, thus indicating that the participants, in
general, do not confuse outcome (How bad was the restaurant?) with the actor (How bad was the
man?) or the act (How bad was what the man did?). Surprisingly, the expected interaction effect
between age and condition (Neutral Intent Bad Outcome Fire /Bad Intent Neutral Outcome No
Fire) was not obtained, F (2, 80) = .57, p > .50, p2 = .01. However, condition did have a
significant effect, F (1, 80) = 8.74, p < .004, p2 = .10. All age groups judged the no fire (bad
intention) act as worse than the fire (bad outcome) act. Also, there was a non-significant trend
for moral judgments to get less severe with age regardless of the type of transgression (film).
The discrepancy between these moral judgment scores and the decisional criteria (bias scores)
reflecting the balance of false alarms and misses is discussed later.
Discussion
The major findings of this study are (1) younger (7-9 years old) children appear to use a
general strategy, ‘when in doubt, positively identify’ regardless of the framing of the act whereas
the next oldest group (10-12 years old) used a laxer criterion, indicated by more frequent false
alarms, when identifying the perpetrator in the bad outcome (fire) condition than in the bad
intention (no fire) condition. The adolescents (13-15 years old) did not significantly respond
differently to the two framing conditions. (2) When choosing which was worse, false alarms or
misses, (a) many of the youngest children reasoned about false alarms and misses in non-moral
terms (i.e., without regard to the consequences of their identification); (b) the next oldest group
reasoned in moral terms, but thought misses were worse, whereas (c) the adolescents thought
false alarms were worse mostly for moral reasons. These results did not appear to depend on
condition (fire/no fire). (3) When asked explicitly about how bad the act and actor were, all age
groups thought the bad intention act and actor were worse.
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It was surprising that the explicit moral judgment questions (the moral judgment
composite index) did not reveal the expected interaction between age and condition, with
younger children judging the bad outcome act as worse and the adolescents judging the bad
intention act worse. This absence of support for the assumed developmental shift from an
outcome to an intention orientation may be because of the vivid mode of presentation (film
rather than the standard verbal format). In any case, generally younger and older children and
adolescents tended to judge the bad intended act as worse despite the severity of the outcome!
However, eyewitness identification judgments, in particular, the false alarms rate, as indicated by
the bias index, did show a developmental difference. Perhaps, the false alarms acted as a sort of
implicit measure reflecting the influence of outcome on the 10- to 12- year- olds, who
differentiated between the two conditions (framings of the act) although the explicit (moral
judgment composite) showed the opposite condition difference (i.e., bad intention was worse
than bad outcome). One might ask why this was not also true for the youngest group of
participants (7- to 9- year- olds). We believe that the key to this puzzle lies in our finding that the
youngest children do not approach the identification task as having moral consequences and,
therefore, any moral significance. Thus, these youngest children appear to be insensitive to the
moral framing of the act.
General Discussion
We began by posing the question as to why young children are prone specifically to make
more false alarms and our results suggest a partial answer. The answer lies in the following
findings: First, we have confirmed in all three studies, that indeed the decisional criterion used
by younger children is laxer, allowing for more false alarms, over and above any differences in
overall accuracy, in comparison to older children and especially with adolescents. Further, as
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evidenced in Studies 1 and 3 this decisional difference is constrained by how the event is framed.
Rather than an overall, perhaps impulsive, tendency to guess or affirm, it appears to be limited to
events that involve moral transgressions (Study 1) and further depends on the nature of the moral
transgression, for example, whether malevolently intended with little damage or unintended but
with major damage, although this interacts with the age of the participant (Study 3), as described
and discussed earlier. One may ask ‘What about the age of the child makes him/her more
cognizant of the moral implications of their eyewitness decision?’. A possible critical fact may
be the child’s increasing ability and propensity to consider the implications of their acts from the
others’ point of view, usually termed, perspective taking (e.g., Piaget, 1929; Selman, 1971)
Third, children’s stated beliefs about the seriousness of false alarms and misses, as
distinguished from their actual performance, systematically change with age. Namely, many of
the younger children either do not appear to treat these errors as having any moral significance
or, if they do, they believe misses are worse; older children do generally recognize the moral
significance of the two kinds of errors, but generally believe misses are worse. It is only in
adolescence that the majority of participants think false alarms are worse for moral reasons.
Fourth, we have obtained some evidence of a relationship between (a) the shift in actual
performance from committing more false alarms than misses and (b) the shift in beliefs.
However, the nature of the relationship is somewhat different from that initially expected: Those
who do not view the task as moral are more prone to employ a laxer decisional criterion than
those who view the task as a moral one, but it does not appear to make as much of a difference
whether the latter group think false alarms or misses are worse! It should be noted that the
number of participants in the non-moral beliefs group was relatively small (only 11 in the no fire
condition). Clearly, this finding needs further exploration.
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Finally, despite the fact that participants at all ages in the third study explicitly recognize
the greater culpability of an act based on malevolence despite minor outcome, compared to the
unintended act resulting in major damage in their explicit moral judgments (the composite moral
judgment measure), the middle age group (10-to 12- year- olds) use a laxer criterion, that is,
committing more false alarms, when the act involves unintended but major damage.
In a sense, one might view the identification task as a type of implicit moral judgment
recently documented by other researchers (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, 2002) at least for the 10- to
12- year- olds. For this age group, despite the fact that they explicitly recognize that a bad
intended act is to be condemned despite the minor outcome, an unintended act with major
outcome (e.g., a destructive fire) elicits a laxer decisional criterion when actually identifying the
culprit. Perhaps, in the emotionally-arousing fire condition, the identification task may operate as
an implicit moral judgment or, to put it more starkly, damage was done; someone must pay.
Thus, those who are accused of accidentally causing great damage may be at greater risk of
being falsely identified by children, as reflected in looser decisional criteria, that is, more false
alarms, regardless of the explicitly recognized good intentions, philosophical and legal principles
to the contrary. These findings may have important implications for actual legal practice, and
demonstrate—we believe—the usefulness of bringing a moral-decisional lens to bear on the
phenomena.
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Appendix: Computer Practice

1. ‘Click the button that would tell me that you were very sure about something - like your
name’;
2. ‘Click the button that would tell me that you are just a little bit less sure than the last time’;
3. ‘Click the button that would tell me how sure you are that today is Sunday’;
4. ‘Click the button that would tell me how sure you are just a little bit less sure that it isn’t
Sunday’.

31

Running Head: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AS MORAL DECISION-MAKING

Author Note
This paper is based, in part, on pre-dissertation research (study 2) and dissertation
research (study 3) by the first author and supervised by the second author. The first and second
authors co-wrote the paper, with assistance from the third author. Spring is an Adjunct Assistant
Professor at Queens College of CUNY; Saltzstein is Professor of Developmental and Social
Psychology at the CUNY Graduate School; and Peach is a Research Associate at Lehman
College of CUNY.
Acknowledgements
The authors also wish to thank Carla Martinez, Vienna Messina, David Barnard, and
Yoko Takagi for aid in collecting data, coding responses, and analyzing data. A special thanks to
Teri Cao for the professional filming. Thanks, are also extended to the school administrators,
teachers and students of the participating schools. Some of this research was supported by a
grant from PSC-CUNY to the second author. We also wish to thank Brian Cox and Jay
Verkuilen for expert advice on signal detection methodology, and the two anonymous reviewers
for helping to clarifying this research report.

32

Running Head: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AS MORAL DECISION-MAKING

Footnotes
It is customary in the Signal Detection literature to use the terms: false alarms and
misses instead of false positives and false negatives. Of course, none of these terms were used
with the children.
2

We use the term eyewitness identification rather than facial identification even though

this research is not conducted in a forensic setting because (a) the whole person was visible in
the task and (b) more importantly, because the purpose was to identify a wrongdoer not just any
person.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Relationship between sensitivity (d’) and age by condition (Study 1).
Figure 2. Relationship between bias (C3) and age by condition (Study1).
Figure 3. Relationship between sensitivity (d’) and age by school (Study 2).
Figure 4. Relationship between bias (C3) and age by school.
Figure 5. Relationship between total moral reasons and age by school (Study 2).
Figure 6. Relationship between sensitivity (d’) and age by condition (Study 3).
Figure 7. Relationship between bias (C3) and age by condition. (Note. Bad outcome [Fire]. Bad
intent [No fire].)
Figure 8. Relationship between ‘Which is worse reason’ composite scores and age group by
condition. (Note. Conditions: Bad intent neutral outcome [No fire] and Neutral intent bad
outcome [Fire].)
Figure 9. Relationship between bias (C3) and moral vs. non-moral reasons.
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